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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 950333-CA
Priority No. 2

TONY PEREZ,
Defendant/Appellant.

STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Rule 801(c), Utah Rules of Evidence, provides:
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other
than one made by the declarant while testifying at the

trial or hearing, offered
of the matter
asserted.

in evidence

to prove

the

truth

Emphasis added.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402(1) (1995) provides:
Possession of property recently stolen, when no
satisfactory explanation of such possession is made,
shall be deemed prima facie evidence that the person in
possession stole the property.

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE PARTIES AGREE THAT THE CONVICTION FOR
DRIVING WHILE UNLICENSED IS UNSUPPORTED BY THE
RECORD AND MUST BE VACATED.
(Responding to State's brief at Point I, pp. 8-11)
There being no dispute, this issue requires no further
discussion or reply.

Counsel for the State should be commended for

his candor to the Court in resolving this issue without further
burdening the resources of the Court.

POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT'S EXCLUSION OF
APPELLANT'S TESTIMONY CONCERNING STATEMENTS
MADE TO HIM BY JOSE ALCANTOR AS HEARSAY WAS
BOTH ERROR AND PREJUDICIAL.
(Responding to State's brief at Point II, pp. 1117)
A.

THE PROFFERED STATEMENTS WERE NOT OFFERED
FOR THE TRUTH OF THE MATTER ASSERTED, AND
THUS FALL OUTSIDE THE AMBIT OF THE
HEARSAY RULE.

The State asserts that the trial court properly sustained
hearsay objections to appellant's attempts to testify concerning
statements made by Jose Alcantor.

E.g., State's brief at 11 ("II.

ALTHOUGH THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY SUSTAINED THE STATE'S HEARSAY
OBJECTIONS . . . " ) ,

14 ("the objected-to questions and answers did

ask for or give inadmissible hearsay"),
this

unobjected-to

illustrates

the

exchange

hearsay

to

the

problems.

and 15 n.5
earlier

("Comparing

colloquies

Throughout

the

best

earlier

discussions, defendant restated the words uttered by Al Cantor. C13
In this exchange, however, the defendant only recollected

the

substance of the information that caused him to run and to believe
the car was not stolen, not Al Cantor's precise words.").

The

State provides no legal analysis for its erroneous conclusion.
Rule 801(c), Utah Rules of Evidence, defines hearsay as
follows:
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than
one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial

or hearing, offered
matter
asserted.

in evidence

ll!

to prove

the truth

of

the

Alcantor" is spelled inconsistently in the record, appearing
also as "al Cantor" or "Al Cantor." All such references are to the
same individual. The correct spelling is unclear.
2

Emphasis added.

As argued at length in appellant's opening brief

at pp. 11-13, none of the statements were offered for the truth of
the matter asserted.
Mr.

Perez

sought

to testify

concerning verbal

acts.

Appellant was entitled to testify that these acts occurred.

E.g.,

Provo City v. Warden, 844 P.2d 360, 365

(Utah App. 1992)

("The

trial court, however, admitted these statements as evidence of
verbal acts, and not for their substantive truth.");
Board

of

Educ. . 604

P.2d

480,

485

(Utah

1979)

Durfey v.
("Therefore,

utterances (or verbal acts), evidence of which is offered for some
purpose other than to prove the truth of the matter stated, a[re]
not excludable as hearsay."); Lake Shore Motor Coach Lines, Inc. v.
Welling, 339 P.2d 1011, 1014 (Utah 1959) ("His testimony did not
purport to assure the truth of these statements but was a report
about the conduct of people, including some of their verbal acts,
as observed by him."); John C. Cutler Ass'n v. De Jay Stores, 279
P.2d 700, 705 (Utah 1955) ("Where the 'question is not whether the
statements are true, but whether they were made' n such statements
are not excluded by the rule against hearsay."); Hawkins v. Perry,
253 P.2d 372, 374-5 (Utah 1953) ("Perry's statements at the time of
the

transaction

happening

which

second-hand.

were
the

not

declarations

percipient

as

witnesses

to
are

some

antecedent

relating

to

us

They are the verbal acts which go to make up the very

transaction which is under scrutiny to determine its legal effect.
The fact that promises and representations were made is material to
the issues of this action . . . " ) .
3

The first statement, "Tony, Tony.", R. 289, is not a
declarative statement.

"Tony" can neither be true nor false.

is a verbal act, pure and simple.

It

The next statement, "He said,

'Do you want to go for a ride?'", R. 292, is a mere verbal act.
While these statements by themselves have little or no evidentiary
significance

for

Mr.

Perez,

they

are

illustrative

of

the

fundamental misunderstanding of the hearsay rule by the prosecutor,
the trial court, and now the Assistant Attorney General.

The

string of improper hearsay exclusions collectively deprived Mr.
Perez of the opportunity to defend against the charges brought
against him.
The first substantive statement, "Yeah, he did [represent
that the car was his].", R. 292, was also a verbal act.

It was

offered not for its truth,2 but rather to show that the statement
was made and led to Mr. Perez's good faith belief that the car
belonged to Mr. Alcantor.

Mr. Perez was denied the opportunity to

present his defense.
The next statement, "He told me he bought the car.", R.
292, follows the identical logic of the prior statement.

The

statement was admissible to show that the statement was made and
led to Mr. Perez's good faith belief that the car belonged to Mr.
Alcantor.

Mr. Perez was again denied the opportunity to present

his defense.
The statement, "Q

So why did you run, Tony?

A

Because he told me the car was stolen.", R. 299, was again a verbal
2

Nobody seriously contends that Mr. Alcantor owned the car.
4

It was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted,3

act.

rather it was offered to show that the statement was made, was the
first indication to Mr. Perez that the car was stolen, and caused
him to flee the scene.

For a third time, Mr. Perez was denied the

opportunity to present his defense.
Not one of the hearsay objections was properly taken.
All the evidence was admissible, and should have been admitted.

B.

MR. PEREZ WAS PREJUDICED BY THE ERRONEOUS
HEARSAY EXCLUSION OF HIS DEFENSE.

The State's argument concerning the erroneous hearsay
exclusion of Mr. Perez's testimony centers on the prejudice prong
of the inquiry.

Mr. Perez was prejudiced.

The State cites State v. Butler, 560 P.2d 1136, 1140
(Utah 1977) (Hall, J., concurring) in support of the proposition
that any error was harmless.

Butler is distinguishable:

In fact, the court allowed defendant to
testify, over objection, about the conversation with his
wife wherein she related that the victim had threatened
defendant with bodily harm.
In light of this ruling
allowing hearsay, the prior ruling prohibiting it, if

error at all,

560

P. 2d

at

1136

was harmless
(emphasis

error.

in original) .

By

overruling

an

objection to the testimony, the trial court made clear to the jury
that the evidence was properly admissible and should be considered.
Here, there was no objection at the time Mr. Perez was allowed to
testify that he found out from Mr. Alcantor that the car was
3

Coincidentally, this statement was in fact true, although
that fact in no way impacts the proper analysis under the hearsay
rule.
5

stolen.

In the wake of repeated exclusions on hearsay grounds, and

absent any indication from the trial court that this evidence was
properly admissible, there can be no confidence that the jury
accepted this testimony at face value.
The jury had just witnessed repeated sustained objections
to Mr. Perez testifying about the statements of others.
291, 292, 297-8, 299.

The trial court had admonished Mr. Perez:

"Mr. Perez, don't tell us what anybody else said."
jury

instructions

R. 289,

instructed

that

testimony was not to be considered.

inadmissible

R. 292.
and

The

stricken

Instruction 6 (R. 85) . Under

the circumstances it is probable that the jury came away with the
impression that Mr. Perez was not allowed to testify concerning
statements made by others, and that all such testimony should be
ignored

and

disregarded.

The

trial

court's

erroneous

ruling

prevented Mr. Perez from presenting his defense.
Mr. Perez should be granted a new trial.

POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING JURY
INSTRUCTION NUMBER NINETEEN.
(Responding to State's brief at Point III, pp. 1720)
The State correctly notes that Instruction 19 did not
contain the words "shall" or "prima facie."
State v. Chambers, 709 P. 2d 321

However, the court in

(Utah 1985) did not limit its

disapproval to "shall" and "prima facie":

Thus, the statutory

language

should

not be used in

any

form in instructing juries in criminal cases, and we
expressly disavow the language and holdings of our
earlier cases to the contrary.

Chambers, 709 P. 2d at 327 (emphasis added) . The Supreme Court did
not limit its holding to "shall" and "prima facie"; this Court
should decline to do so.
Appellant

recognizes

that

instructions have been approved.

permissive

inference

E.g., Barnes v. United States,

412 U.S. 837, 93 S.Ct. 2357, 37 L.Ed.2d 380 (1973) . This in no way
limits the Utah Supreme
different result.

Court's

supervisory power

to reach a

E.g., State v. Gordon, No. 940558, slip op. at

6 (Utah 1996); State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 857 (Utah 1992); State
v. Carter, 888 P.2d 629, 650 n.32 (Utah) , cert, denied,

U.S.

,

116 S.Ct. 163, 133 L.Ed.2d 105 (1995); State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d
393, 406 n.7

(Utah 1994)

("[T]he invocation of our supervisory

powers . . . demonstrates a commitment on the part of this court to
prospectively prohibit the use of the offending language [in the
reasonable doubt instruction]."), cert, denied,

U.S.

, 115

S.Ct. 910, 130 L.Ed.2d 792 (1995).
For

reasons

stated

as

early

as

1916,

inference

instructions are problematic:
We think a charge, that recent possession of stolen
property when the party in possession failed to make a
satisfactory explanation was prima facie evidence of
guilt, may do harm by singling out and emphasizing
particular evidence in a cause to the exclusion of other
evidence which may be of equal or greater importance,
and, without further explanation or direction, may tend
to convey a meaning to the jury that when such enumerated
particulars are shown the burden of proof is shifted to
the accused, which, if not sustained by him, requires the
verdict to be cast against him.
Barretta. 155 P. 343, 346-47 (Utah 1916).
The instruction at issue here provided:
7

Possession of property recently stolen, if not
satisfactorily explained, is ordinarily a circumstance
from which you may reasonably draw the inference and
find, in light of the surrounding circumstances shown by
the evidence in the case, that the person in possession
of the stolen property stole the property and knew that
it was stolen.
Thus, if you find from the evidence and beyond
a reasonable doubt
(1)
that the defendant was in
possession of property,
(2)
that the property was
stolen, (3) that such possession was not too remote in
point of time from the theft, and
(4)
that no
satisfactory explanation appears from the evidence, then
you may infer from these facts and find that the
defendant stole the property and knew the property was
stolen.
Instruction 19, R. 98.
This

instruction

suffers

from

each

of

the

problems

identified in Barretta: it singles out and emphasizes particular
evidence in the case to the exclusion of other evidence which may
be of equal or greater importance, and tends to convey to the jury
that when such enumerated particulars are shown the burden of proof
is shifted to the accused, which, if not sustained by him, requires
conviction.
The instruction given here is markedly inferior to those
upheld in other cases.

The instruction in Barnes was as follows:

Possession of recently stolen property, if not
satisfactorily explained, is ordinarily a circumstance
from which you may reasonably draw the inference and
find, in the light of the surrounding circumstances shown
by the evidence in the case, that the person in
possession knew the property had been stolen.

However,
you are never
required
to make
this
inference.
It is the exclusive
province
of the jury to
determine
whether the facts and circumstances
shown by
the evidence in this case warrant any inference
which the
law permits the jury to draw from the possession of
recently stolen property.
The term 'recently7 is a relative term, and has no
fixed meaning.
Whether property may be considered as
recently stolen depends upon the nature of the property,
8

and all the facts and circumstances shown by the evidence
in the case. The longer the period of time since the
theft the more doubtful becomes the inference which may
reasonably be drawn from unexplained possession.
If you should find beyond a reasonable doubt from
the evidence in the case that the mail described in the
indictment was stolen, and that while recently stolen the
contents of said mail here, the four United States
Treasury checks, were in the possession of the defendant
you would ordinarily be justified in drawing from those
facts the inference that the contents were possessed by
the accused with knowledge that it was stolen property,
unless such possession is explained by facts and
circumstances in this case which are in some way
consistent with the defendant's innocence.
In considering whether possession of recently stolen
property has been satisfactorily explained, you
are

reminded that in the exercise of constitutional
rights
the accused need not take the witness stand and
testify.
Possession may be satisfactorily
explained through
other circumstances,
other evidence, independent of any
testimony of the accused.

Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. at 840 n.3, 93 S.Ct. at 2360 n.3,
3 7 L.Ed.2d at 3 84 n.3 (emphasis added) .
The first paragraph is the functional equivalent of the
instruction given here.

However, the jury here was not advised

that they were not required to make the inference.

The language of

Instruction 19 was designed precisely to lead the jury into making
the inference, in spite of any qualms the jurors might have.
Certain evidence, i.e. possession, was unduly emphasized to the
exclusion of other more probative evidence, i.e. testimony that
Jose Alcantor picked appellant up in the car and claimed to own it.
Instruction 19 also does not clarify that a reasonable
explanation can arise from the facts and circumstances of the case,
rather than solely the testimony of the defendant.

The jury here

was not reminded that the defendant had no obligation to testify.
Viewing "satisfactory explanation" in the ordinary sense of the
9

words, the jury expects the defendant to explain.

The instruction

should have clarified that the facts and circumstances can explain
the possession, rather than merely testimony of the defendant.
As pointed out in appellant's opening brief, Instruction
19 suffered the additional problem that it did not state that
possession alone is insufficient to sustain a conviction; to the
contrary, Instruction 19 stated that possession alone is sufficient
to sustain a conviction.

This is contrary to established Utah law.

See opening brief at pp. 18-22, and cases cited therein.
Mr. Perez was prejudiced by Instruction 19, and should be
granted a new trial.
* * *

Mr. Perez relies on his opening brief in response to
those portions of the State's brief not separately replied to here.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Perez respectfully requests that his conviction for
driving while unlicensed be vacated and a judgment of acquittal be
entered, and that his conviction for theft by receiving be reversed
and remanded for further proceedings.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^^tt

day of March, 1996.

ROBERT K. HEINEMAN
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

ROBIN K. YOUNGBERG
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, Robert K. Heineman, hereby certify that I have caused
eight copies of the foregoing to be delivered to the Utah Court of
Appeals, 400 Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84102, and four copies to the Attorney General's Office, Heber
M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South 6th Floor, P.O. Box 140854,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this ,37-tx.

day of March, 1996.
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Robert K. Heineman

DELIVERED/MAILED this

day of March, 1996.
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ADDENDUM A
Jury Instruction 19 (R. 85)

INSTRUCTION NO.
Possession

of

property

4

recently

stolen,

if

not

satisfactorily explained, is ordinarily a circumstance from which
you may reasonably draw the inference and find, in light of the
surrounding circumstances shown by the evidence in the case, that
the person

in possession

of

the stolen property

stole the

property and knew that the property was stolen.
Thus, if you find from the evidence and beyond a reasonable
doubt ilj\

that the defendant was in possession of property, u2)Y

that the property was stolen, f(3y that such possession was not
too remote in point of time from the theft, and

(4) that no

satisfactory explanation of such possession has been given or
appears from the evidence, then you may infer from those facts
and find that the defendant stole the property and knew the
property was stolen.
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